This present study is the first to quantify the transmission of avian influenza virus H5N1 within flocks during the 2004 epidemic in Thailand. It uses the flock-level mortality data to estimate the transmission-rate parameter (␤) and the basic reproduction number (R 0 ). The point estimates of ␤ varied from 2.26/day (95% confidence interval [CI], 2.01-2.55) for a 1-day infectious period to 0.66/day (95% CI, 0.50 -0.87) for a 4-day infectious period, whereas the accompanying R 0 varied from 2.26 (95% CI, 2.01-2.55) to 2.64 (95% CI, 2.02-3.47). Although the point estimates of ␤ of backyard chickens and fighting cocks raised together were lower than those of laying hens and broiler chickens, this difference was not statistically significant. These results will enable us to assess the control measures in simulation studies. They also indicate that, for the elimination of the virus, a critical proportion of the susceptible poultry population in a flock (i.e., 80% of the population) needs to be vaccinated.
Subtype H5N1 of the highly pathogenic avian influenza A (HPAI-A) virus is having a serious impact on poultry production, human health, the livelihood of farmers, wildlife conservation, and other socioeconomic factors in Asia, Africa, and Europe [1, 2] . Several measures to stop the spread of HPAI-A virus (e.g., large-scale culling, movement restrictions, vaccination, and hygienic measures) have been implemented [3] [4] [5] . However, with the exception of continental Europe and Japan, the measures have not yet resulted in the elimination of HPAI-A virus [4, 6, 7] . It has been suggested that a better understanding of the transmission dynamics of HPAI-A virus within flocks could help improve the effectiveness of control measures [4, 8] . In fact, quantification of the within-flock transmission could be useful for (1) determination of the time of introduction of the virus into a flock, (2) estimation of the proportion of animals requiring vaccination, and (3) assessment of the effect of intervention strategies [4, 9, 10] .
Within-flock transmission can be quantified using the basic reproduction number (R 0 ) and the transmission rate parameter (␤). R 0 is the expected number of secondary cases produced by a typical primary case in an entirely susceptible population [11] . R 0 has a threshold value that indicates whether an infection will spread or fade out: if R 0 Ͼ 1, a disease can spread; if R 0 Ͻ 1, chains of transmission will inevitably fade out [11, 12] . Vaccination, one of the tools available to public health officials and veterinarians, helps reduce R 0 to a value Ͻ1, where the critical proportion of a susceptible population to be immunized is 1-1/R 0 [11, 13] . ␤ determines the average rate at which susceptible animals become infected and hence spread a disease within a population. R 0 and ␤ can be quantified from transmission experiments in which a small number of birds in a flock are inoculated with a virus. The status of all birds in the flock is then carefully monitored to record the spread of the virus [14, 15] . However, outbreaks under field conditions can differ considerably from transmission experiments with a few animals under controlled conditions, in term of numbers of animals, contact structure, housing, and management. Especially when R 0 Ͼ 1, which is expected in an unvaccinated population, estimates derived from transmission experiments are often imprecise [14, 15] . In the present study, the within-flock transmission of avian influenza virus H5N1 in infected chicken flocks was quantified by use of mortality data collected during the HPAI-A subtype H5N1 epidemic in Thailand. HPAI has a mortality close to 100%, and mortality data recorded in field situations are a very valuable source in its epidemiological analysis.
Here we quantified the transmission of HPAI-A virus subtype H5N1 within flocks during the 2004 epidemic in Thailand. We also investigated whether the within-flock transmission of H5N1 virus differed between flocks of backyard chickens, broilers, fighting cocks, or laying hens.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Data and model assumptions. The study population included Thai chicken flocks that had tested positive for H5N1 virus by virus isolation during July-November 2004 [7] . In 139 of these flocks, mortality (number of dead birds per day) was recorded for at least 2 days before all animals were culled. This present study was conducted under the implicit assumptions that (1) the chickens had no immunity to H5N1 virus at the time of its introduction, (2) all susceptible chickens were equally susceptible, (3) all infected chickens were equally infectious and spread the virus throughout the flock, and (4) all H5N1-infected chickens eventually died from the disease [16, 17] .
Data-set construction for statistical model. The transmission data set was constructed on the basis of back-calculation, by an approach illustrated in figure 1 [8, 12, 19] . Specifically, before infection, all animals are susceptible (S), and, after infection, they become infectious (I) to other susceptible animals. Then they are removed (R) from the population, in this case because of death [12, 20] . On the basis of the literature, we assumed that chickens that had been infected started to excrete the virus 1-2 days after infection and died within 2-6 days [16, 17, 21, 22] .
Estimation of ␤ requires knowledge of both the number of susceptible chickens (S) and the number of infectious chickens (I) per day [4, 8] . Because HPAI-A is highly lethal to chickens [23, 24] , we presumed that the number of dead chickens per day, in a flock, would be the number of newly infected chickens (cases) at an earlier time (C) when we back-calculated the data sets. In the present analysis, the mortality data on a flock were backcalculated into the format C
(t), S(t), I(t), and R(t), for numbers of birds in each category at time t (days 0, 1, 2, 3, etc.). The total number of chickens in a flock at a specific time t was also designated as N(t) ϭ S(t) ϩ I(t).
On the basis of experimental infection studies of H5N1 virus [16, 17, 21, 22] , we constructed data sets by assuming that the chickens died after an infectious period of 1, 2, 3, or 4 days (table 1) .
Statistical analysis. According to this SIR assumption, the number of newly infected cases (C) per day has an expected value, E(C), that depends on ␤ and the number of S and I animals, in the total flock, per day. The equation for E(C) is shown in figure 1 [25, 26] . Thus, ln (␤) could be estimated by a generalized linear model (GLM) using the statistical program R (version 2.2.0) [26 -28] . At this stage, the back-calculated data sets (exemplified in table 1) on 139 flocks were used to estimate ␤. In this analysis, C was a dependent variable, and ln(S(t)I(t)/N(t)) was included as an offset variable. Flock types (i.e., backyard chickens, broiler chickens, laying hens, and fighting cocks) were added as a categorical, fixed effect, and flock was added as a random effect. The latter was needed because more observations from the same flock were included in the data set [26, 28] . We also used the negative binomial distribution, instead of a binomial or Poisson distribution, to correct for overdispersion of the outcome of the model [26, 29] . Akaike's information criterion (AIC) was used to select the best-fitting model. The model with the lowest AIC value received the most support from the data [29, 30] . Subsequently, the R 0 was calculated as R 0 ϭ ␤T, the product of the infectious period T (days) and ␤ (individuals per day) [4, 11] . ) . B, Equation for the expected value for newly infected cases, used for statistical analysis [12, 18] .
RESULTS

Characteristics of the H5N1-infected flocks.
The characteristics of the 139 H5N1-infected chicken flocks used in the present study are summarized in figure 2. Most of these flocks (67%) were backyard chickens of relatively small size; whereas the laying-hen and broiler-chicken flocks were generally much larger: the flock size of the backyard chickens and fighting cocks raised together was 8 -300 birds/flock, that of the laying hens was 197-7604 birds/flock, and that of the broiler chickens was 400 -21,500 birds/flock. Cumulative mortality in the 139 infected flocks was 2% within 1 day of the appearance of clinical signs, with 100% mortality within 6 days and average daily mortality progressing from 1% to 36%.
Within-flock transmission. (table 2) . The values of ␤ and R 0 for the different types of chicken flocks at the specified infectious periods are also shown in table 2. Although the point estimates of ␤ and R 0 for backyard chickens and fighting cocks raised together were lower than those for laying hens and broiler chickens, the difference was not statistically significant.
DISCUSSION
Estimates of ␤ and R 0 . In the present study, we quantified the within-flock transmission of HPAI-A virus subtype H5N1 in infected chicken flocks during the 2004 epidemic in Thailand, for different types of chicken operations. The values of ␤ resulting from this study are 0.66 -2.26/day (table 2) ; these values are much lower than the point estimate of 33/day for a 6-day infectious period that van der Goot et al. [14] have reported for HPAI-A virus subtype H7N7. However, their estimate was based on the observations of only 2 contact-infected chickens, resulting in a CI of 1.3-ϱ for R 0 , which includes our estimates of R 0 within the range of 2-5. Our value for R 0 is also much lower than that used by Savill et al. [9] . In this case, comparison is difficult because their R 0 estimates were modeled on the basis of data from experiments with individually challenged birds, and therefore were not quantified on the basis of either transmission data or data originating from H5N1-infected flocks in field conditions, as in our study. However, the estimate of R 0 in the present study is higher than estimates for human flu pandemics (e.g.,
for the human pandemic A [H3N2] in Hong Kong [31] and 2-3 for the 1918 human pandemic A [(H1N1] in the United States [32]).
We think it very likely that the transmission of HPAI-A virus subtype H5N1 differed between the various types of flocks, because of the contact-structure differences between them, due to age, flock size, breed, management, and possibility of contact. Moreover, we expected that the differences in the density at which the chickens are housed would have an impact on transmission [4, 8, 33, 34] . However, in the present study, no significant within-flock transmission difference between flock types was found. Nevertheless, the resulting point estimates support the intuitive suggestion that within-flock transmission in backyard chickens and fighting cocks raised together is lower than Example of data-set construction of a laying hen flock,  based on SIR model, at hypothetically different infectious periods  of 1, 2, or 3 NOTE. C, number of newly infected chickens (cases) at an earlier time when we back-calculated the data sets; SIR, before infection, all animals are susceptible (S), and, after infection, become infectious (I) to other susceptible animals, and are removed (R) from the population, in this case because of death. a Assumes that the number of dead animals represents the number of newly infected animals at an earlier time after introduction of the virus into a flock.
b After back-calculation of raw data, records containing complete data in C, S, I, and N columns were used to estimate the transmission-rate parameter (␤).
that in broiler chickens and laying hens. In addition, the model with 3 groups of flocks-laying hens, broiler chickens, and backyard chickens and fighting cocks raised together-shows that the point estimates of transmission is higher in broiler chickens than in laying hens or backyard chickens (results not shown). This would reflect the effect that contact-structure differences have on transmission. Broiler chickens are kept as 1 group, with a high possibility for mutual contact. Laying hens are kept in battery cages, with a large number of cages housed together. Backyard chickens and fighting cocks mingle freely in the village and may have lower possibility for contact than do broiler chickens and laying hens.
Bias, data validity, and back-calculation assumptions. Records of dead birds might not have been kept with the same accuracy by all poultry keepers. Moreover, record keeping might have differed depending on flock type. The number of chicken houses of large commercial poultry units, which was not known, may have caused an underestimation of the ␤ if the disease occurred in only 1 house in a commercial unit with several houses. Data such as the total number of animals and the number of deaths per day really should be recorded per house, to facilitate epidemiologic analysis.
In our assumptions, all chickens within a flock were equally infectious for a designated period. This may differ from actual biological conditions, leading to overly precise results in the present study. Moreover, on the basis of the lethality of HPAI-A virus subtype H5N1, we assumed that all infected chickens eventually died. However, during the outbreak, culling had to be performed immediately after the infection was recognized. As a consequence, mortality data on the day of culling might not have been accurate. In our analysis, a latent-infection period (i.e., infected but not yet infectious) was not included, because, when using 1-day time interval, we assumed that an infected individual became immediately infectious [12] . Experimental studies of H5N1 have not yielded clear results on the existence or length of a latent infection period [16, 17, 21, 22] . Also, assuming an SIR model instead of an SEIR model allowed better fitting of the data (results not shown).
Application of modeling to intervention strategies. A goal of control strategies is to reduce R 0 to Ͻ1. In general, R 0 reduction in animal populations can be achieved in 3 ways, by reducing the (1) contact rate between animals, by isolation or separation; (2) infectiousness of infected animals, by treatment or vaccination; or (3) susceptibility of still uninfected animals, by vaccination [4, 8, 35] . When an HPAI-A epidemic in an avian species is quickly controlled, the risk of human infection is reduced [10] . Vaccination of domestic poultry against the H5N1 subtype of avian influenza has been used in several countries. Using vaccination to reduce the transmission rate could provide an alternative to mass culling, by reducing both the susceptibility of healthy flocks and the infectiousness of infected flocks. However, incomplete protection at the flock level can cause the silent spread of the virus within and between flocks. If vaccination is used but is not appropriately managed as part of a control strategy, elimination of the disease will not be achieved, and the concomitant public health risk will still be present [9, 36, 37] .
In the present study, the upper limit of the R 0 estimate was 5.0 (table 2), on the basis of the model with broiler chickens and laying hens used as a categorical variable (in the worst-case scenario). Therefore, the present study indicates that if at least 80% of the birds in a flock are effectively vaccinated, a major spread of the virus will not occur, on the basis of the fraction of 1-1/R 0 [11] . In commercial flocks, it is feasible to apply and maintain a vaccination coverage for Ͼ80% of a total flock. However, vaccination coverage of 80% might be more difficult in backyard chickens. Another problem is that vaccine efficacy is seldom 100% [14, 16, 22] . In that case, the vaccination coverage will need to be higher than the estimated value of 1-1/R 0 (i.e., Ͼ80%) but not as high as suggested by those who assume a much higher R 0 [9, 14] .
For other species (e.g., quails, geese, and domestic ducks), the data available are insufficient to allow transmission to be estimated. In addition, the mortality-based approach cannot be used for domestic ducks, because they show very little or late mortality [38, 39] . We suggest that transmission studies in domestic ducks be based on longitudinal serological results.
Nowadays, mathematical modeling is widely used and has become a tool for preparedness planning and for modeling of new disease outbreaks [9, 13] . The results of our analyses seemed quantitatively robust, so our ␤ values can be used in simulation models to estimate the effectiveness of intervention measures.
In conclusion, ␤ and R 0 of HPAI-A virus subtype H5N1 were estimated by the use of mortality data collected at the flock level, from the field. This quantitative information can be used to plan a future program for control of HPAI-A.
